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Picketing and Privacy: Can I Patrol
on the Street Where You Live?
Edward B. Arnolds* and Michael P. Seng**
I believe that the homes of men. . can be protected by government
from noisy, marching, threatening picketers and demonstrators
Justice Black concurring in Gregory v. City of Chicago t

[The Illinois Residential Picketing Statute's] broad prohibition represents the judgment of the Illinois legislature that any residential picketing--quiet, or raucous, by one picket or 300, for one hour or one

day-intrudes upon [the fundamental right of residential privacy].
Brief of Defendant Carey in Brown v. Scotttt
The Court today suggests that some picketing activities would have

but a "negligible impact on privacy interests," intimating that Illinois
could satisfy its interests through more limited restrictions on picketing, such as regulating the hours and numbers of pickets.
Justice Rehnquist dissenting in Carey v. Brown ttt
I.

CAREY V. BROWN: THE SUPREME COURT AVOIDS THE ISSUE

On September 6, 1977, at approximately 6:15 p.m., about twenty
persons, most of them members of the Committee Against Racism,
picketed the home of Michael A. Bilandic, who was then Mayor of the
City of Chicago.I The picketers were protesting the Mayor's failure to
espouse busing to achieve racially integrated public schools.2 Most of
the picketers were arrested and charged with residential picketing3 and
* J.D. 1973, The Northwestern University School of Law; Associate Professor of Law, The
John Marshall Law School.
** J.D. 1967, Notre Dame Law School; Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law
School.
t 394 U.S. 111, 125-26 (1969).
Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 12, Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'dsub
"
non Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
t tt 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980).
I. Brown v. Scott, 462 F. Supp. 518, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1978),rev'd, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979),
af'd sub nom Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). The authors represented the Committee
Against Racism and its members in the ensuing litigation, including the state criminal action and
the above cited federal proceedings.
2. Id.
3. The Illinois Residential Picketing Statute provided:
It is unlawful to picket before or about the residence or dwelling of any person, except
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disorderly conduct.' Pursuant to a plea agreement, they pled guilty to
the charge of residential picketing and were variously sentenced to six
months' to one year's supervision.' Approximately six months later,
they filed a civil rights action 6 in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. Alleging the facts stated above, they
claimed that they wished to engage in residential picketing again but
were deterred from doing so by the threat of prosecution under the
Illinois Residential Picketing Statute, and that the Statute violated the
first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.'
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found in
favor of the defendants on the merits, holding that the Statute was
neither vague, overbroad, nor violative of equal protection.8 The
plaintiffs appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed on the equal protection ground.9
The defendants appealed and in a six to three decision the United
States Supreme Court affirmed sub nom Carey v. Brown." In doing so,
the Court considered only the equal protection issue, holding that the
Statute violated the equal protection clause because it discriminated
among pickets based on the subject matter of their expression, since the
Statute excepted from its prohibition the picketing of a residence that
was also a place of employment involved in a labor dispute.' The
Court thus left open the question of whether a statute barring all residential picketing, regardless of subject matter, would be an overbroad
restriction of activity protected by the first amendment. 2 That is the
question this Article will consider.
when the residence or dwelling is used as a place of business. However, this Article does
not apply to a person peacefully picketing his own residence or dwelling and does not
prohibit the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute or
the place of holding a meeting or assembly on premises commonly used to discuss subjects of general public interest.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 21.1-2 (1979) (declared unconstitutional in Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791
(7th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (amended 1980)). There is no
officially recorded legislative history. For an unofficial account, see Heinz, Gettleman & Seeskin,
Legirlatve Poilcs and the Crimial Law, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 293-96 (1969).
4. Brown, 462 F. Supp. at 519.
5. Id.
6. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); it sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. Brown, 426 F. Supp. at 519, 521.
7. Brown, 462 F. Supp. at 519, 534.
8. Id. at 518.
9. Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979), af'dsub nom Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455

(1980).
10. 447 U.S. 455 (1980). The Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented.
11.Id. at 459 & n.2.
12. Although the majority did not face the issue directly, Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent
that the majority implicitly decided the issue. Rehnquist noted, "The Court today suggests that
some picketing activities would have but a 'negligible impact on privacy interests,' intimating that
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The question is not purely theoretical. Subsequent to Carey v.
Brown, the Illinois Legislature deleted the labor exception; the
amended Statute prohibits all picketing of purely private residences,
except one's own residence.' 3 Other states and some municipalities
have similar laws.4
II.

POSING THE ISSUE: PRIVACY INTERESTS VERSUS FREE SPEECH
INTERESTS

The Court in Carey v. Brown was not faced with the issue of the

constitutionality of banning even "the classic expressive gesture of the
solitary picket" 5 from the public streets and sidewalks in front of private residences. However, Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent the
implication in the majority's opinion that such a ban would be unconstitutional since the State's interest in protecting residential privacy
could be satisfactorily protected by more limited restrictions such as
regulating the hour and number of pickets.' 6 Justice Rehnquist himself
disagreed with that sentiment. He would have permitted the State to
conclude that the presence of even a solitary unwelcome picketer on
the street in front of one's home was an intolerable intrusion on residential privacy because "few of us. . .would7 feel comfortable knowing that a stranger lurks outside our home."'
Even Justice Rehnquist admitted, however, that residential picketing by one such as a domestic employee, who has no alternative forum
for effectively airing his grievance, would arguably be protected by the
Illinois could satisfy its interests through more limited restrictions on picketing, such as regulating
the hours and numbers of pickets." Id. at 478 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13. The Illinois Residential Picketing Statute, as amended, provides:
It is unlawful to picket before or about the residence or dwelling of any person, except
when the residence or dwelling is used as a place of business. However, this Article does
not apply to a person peacefully picketing his own residence or dwelling and does not
prohibit the peaceful picketing of the place of holding a meeting or assembly on premises
commonly used to discuss subjects of general public interest.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 21.1-2 (1981).
The new Statute has been enforced against protesters who picketed the residence of Mayor
Byrne of Chicago to protest her appointments to the Chicago Housing Authority. The Mayor
lived in a high-rise on Chicago's near north side. See Chicago Tribune, July 28, 1982, § 1, at 13,
col. 2.
14. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2909 (1978); ARK.STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2966, 41-2968
(1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-120 (1962); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 379A-1 (1976); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 580A (1982); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-418, 18.2-419 (1982).
15. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972).
16. 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 478-79. Equating picketing with loitering, of course, ignores that the picket is engaged in expressive activity. However, even loitering may be protected by the first amendment.
See Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156 (1972).
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But an exception for the domestic employee from

an otherwise absolute ban on residential picketing would clearly violate
the rule in Carey v. Brown against subject matter discrimination among
pickets.' 9 After Carey v. Brown, therefore, the question of whether a
peaceful picket creates an intolerable intrusion on residential privacy
must be asked without reference to the subject matter of the picket's

message. Put another way, under Carey v. Brown, if the domestic employee has a constitutionally protected right peacefully to picket the
home of his employer, that is, if his presence on the street where the

employer lives is not an intolerable invasion of the resident's privacy,
then every other peaceful picket has the same right. Thus, the question
is posed: Is an absolute ban on residential picketing consistent with the
free speech guarantee of the first amendment as applied to the states by
the fourteenth amendment?
A.

The Cases

Surprisingly few cases have discussed the question of a first
amendment right to picket residences, and those courts that have ruled
on the issue have reached divergent results. 20 Courts have generally
not accorded first amendment protection in cases that involve large

numbers of pickets, 2 ' or where the pickets have been disorderly, 22 or
18. Carey, 447 U.S. at 479 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority noted that although
many state and federal laws provide special protection for labor protests, an argument that the
National Labor Relations Act preempts states from enacting laws prohibiting the picketing of
residences involved in labor disputes would have dubious merit. 1d. at 466 & n.10.
19. See id. at 466; see also People Acting Through Community Effort v. Doorey, 468 F.2d
1143 (1st Cir. 1972); cf. DeGregory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977) (labor picketing
less protected than public issue picketing). It is not clear, however, whether a statute allowing
residential picketing, regardless of subject matter, for all persons who did not have adequate alternative forum would violate the rule of Carey v. Brown. For a discussion of the alternative forum
question, see infra text accompanying notes 107-11.
20. Where the issue has been reached, it is often difficult to determine to what extent the
court's ruling was influenced by the nature and objective of the picketing, and, indeed, to what
extent the court's description of the nature and objective of the picketing was colored by the
court's own view of the propriety of residential picketing. Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1353, 1356 (1972).
See Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 177 (1967); Comment, Picketers at the Doorstep, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95 (1974); Comment, Residential Picketing of a Slum Landlord, 1971 URB. L.J. 223 (1971); Comment, Picketing the Homes of Public
Officials, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 106 (1966); Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1353 (1972).
21. E.g., Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975) (300
pickets); Hebrew Home & Hosp. for Chronic Sick, Inc. v. Davis, 38 Misc. 2d 173, 235 N.Y.S.2d
318 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (40 pickets whose conduct interfered with the normal operation of the home
and hospital); People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Magis. Ct. 1941) ("hundreds of pickets"); City
of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971) (25-35 pickets).
22. E.g., State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 491, 265 N.W. 302 (1936) (small number of pickets carrying banners and cards); Walinsky v. Kennedy, 94 Misc. 2d 121, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
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have trespassed upon private property,2 3 or have been guilty of illegal
coercion. 24 Courts have also refused to protect picketing that consti-

tutes an unfair labor practice25 or has an otherwise illegal object.26 In a
few cases, courts have refused to extend first amendment protection
even to peaceful residential picketing on the theory that a reasonable
alternative forum was available. 27 For example, the district court in
Brown v. Scott upheld, as applied, a statutory ban against even peaceful picketing, reasoning that the right to picket on public sidewalks in
residential areas was not absolute and that on balance the homeowner/public official's privacy interest outweighed the picketer's free

speech interest when an alternative forum-city hall-was available.
Other courts have found that on the balance the free speech interest outweighed the privacy interest and have held that residential picketing is protected by the first amendment. Thus, picketing the home of
their employer by domestic employees2" and picketing the residence of
an absentee slum landlord by his tenants 29 have been held proper
under circumstances where the courts found no reasonable alternative
(chanting crowd of 40 carrying baseball bats, whistles and bullhorns); People v. Kaye, 165 Misc.
663, 1 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Magis. Ct. 1937) (small number of pickets carrying inciting banners).
23. Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975) ("some
300 pickets" chanting ',down with the mayor"); City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182
N.W.2d 530 (1971) (25-35 pickets marching in front of residence).
24. E.g., Zeeman v. Amalgamated Retail & Dep't Store Employees Local 55, 17 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) $ 65,572 (Cal. Super. 1950); Jacobs v. United Furniture Workers Local 576, 16 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 65,065 (Cal. Super. 1949); State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903 (1939) (chauffeur not allowed to picket employer's residence where his conduct was likely to arouse anger,
disturbance or violence); State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 229 N.W. 311 (1930) (pickets produced
banner calling resident a "strikebreaker"); Walinsky v. Kennedy, 94 Misc. 2d 121, 404 N.Y.S.2d
491 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (chanting crowd of 40 carrying baseball bats, whistles and bullhorns); Fawick
Airflex Co. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers Local 735, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 426, 92 N.E.2d
446 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 154 Ohio St. 205, 93 N.E.2d 769 (1950) (intent to influence a
judge in a pending matter by picketing his home is contempt of court); Pipe Mach. Co. v. DeMore,
36 Ohio Ops. 342, 76 N.E.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1947), appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 582, 79 N.E.2d
910 (1948) (pickets made threats, distributed cards calling residents "scabs").
25. Allen-Bradley Local No. I111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740
(1942); see Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). In re
United Mech. Union Local 150-F, 151 N.L.R.B. 386 (1965).
26. Walinsky v. Kennedy, 94 Misc. 2d 191, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (office is proper
alternative forum to picket); Petrucci v. Hogan, 5 Misc. 2d 480, 27 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941)
(ultimate objective was to accomplish an unlawful purpose involving malicious intent to annoy
and intimidate the plaintiffs and their families).
27. Brown v. Scott, 462 F. Supp. 518 (N.D. Ill. 1978), rev'd, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979), affd
sub mom Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
28. Annenberg v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 519 (1974). But see Hate v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 233, 285 N.W. 903 (1939) (chauffeur not
allowed to picket employer's residence).
29. Hibbs v. Neighborhood Org. to Rejuvenate Tenant Hous., 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622
(1969).
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forum. Similarly, picketing the private home of a state governor 30 and
picketing the private residence of a state agency head 3 have been held
to be proper exercises of the right of assembly and petition.
In State v. Schuller,32 which involved peaceful picketing on the
public sidewalk in front of the home of the Secretary of Defense, the
Maryland Court of Appeals refused to place any significance on the
fact that the home of a public official was involved and ignored the
alternative forum question. The court held that the statutory ban on all
residential picketing was overbroad on its face because less restrictive
alternatives could have satisfactorily safeguarded the State's interest in
protecting residential privacy. The court noted that
[iun the present case, the defendants' picketing was peaceful and
on the public street; they neither obstructed traffic nor became disorderly. It was stipulated that they did not disturb the neighbors other
than by engaging in the picketing itself. Moreover [the statute] provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling place of any
individual." Rather than prohibiting certain specific conduct associated with picketing and within the purview of the state's power to
control, the Maryland act provides for a blanket ban on residential
picketing itself. The statute proscribes picketing even if it is peaceful
and orderly, it is quiet and non-threatening, is on public property,
and does not obstruct persons or traffic. The ban applies regardless
of the time of day the picketing takes place. While picketing and
parading and the use of the streets for such purpose is subject to reasonable time, manner and place regulation, such activity may not be
wholly denied . . ..
In the authors' opinion, the Schuller court decided the question rightly
and in accord with the relevant precedents of the United States
Supreme Court.
B. Method of Determining the Rights of Residential Pickets Vis-A- Vis
Homeowners
Most of the courts that have examined the issue whether the first
amendment prohibits an absolute ban on the picketing of private residences have simply balanced the privacy interest of the homeowner
against the free speech interests of the pickets. The argument against
such an approach is that it provides for ad hoc decision making, 34 so
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Flores v. City & County of Denver, 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373 (1950).
State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 372, 274 A.2d 897 (1971-72).
280 Md. 305, 372 A.2d 1076 (1977).
Id. at 315-16, 372 A.2d at 1081 (citation omitted).
Ad hoc balancing has been the subject of much lively debate. Professor Emerson has
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that ultimately the judge is forced to decide based on his own feelings
about picketing and privacy." However, since the United States
Supreme Court has generally rejected the view that first amendment
rights are absolute,3 6 ultimately some form of balancing is inevitable.
Nonetheless, a systematic methodology is needed to help the courts to
balance the values that residential privacy and free speech are meant to
protect so that the conclusion reached is not merely the result of the
personal predisposition of the judge and the opinion a mere rationalization of that preformed conclusion.
The methodology employed by the Supreme Court in United
States v. O'Brien3 7 appears to provide a systematic means to resolve the
conflict between the rights of pickets and the rights of persons who desire peace and quiet in their homes. The Supreme Court noted in
O'Brien that
when "speech" and "non-speech" elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the
governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a
variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating;
paramount; cogent; strong. . . . [W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; if the government interest is unrepersuasively criticized the ad hoc balancing approach by noting that it is "so unstructured that it
can hardly be described as a rule of law at all." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 16 (1970). On the other hand, Professor Shiffrin has cautioned that a "judiciary
aware that it is balancing protected speech out of the first amendment is far more likely to give
speech the protection it deserves." Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and the FirstAmendment Methodology, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 26 (R. Collins ed. 1980).
Professor Shiffrin notes that regardless of the test utilized "a court may not escape the task of
assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation." Id. (emphasis by Professor Shiffrin) (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)).
35. For instance, for Justice Rehnquist the privacy interest would prevail based upon his
general feeling that "few of us... would feel comfortable knowing that a stranger lurks outside
our home." Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478-79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Professor Emerson has noted that all too often balancing seems to be a way of rationalizing
preformed conclusions. T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 718.
36. Even Justice Black, the foremost opponent on the Supreme Court of ad hoc balancing,
was unwilling to absolutely protect expression when it was done in a manner that he found to be
offensive. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131, 151 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
37. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien involved the constitutionality of 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b)(3)
(Supp. V 1965-1969) (now appearing at 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b)(3) (1976)), which made it a crime
for anyone to knowingly destroy or mutilate a draft card. See also Young v. American Mini
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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lated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental re-

striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is
38
essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Although the O'Brien test provides no guarantee that a court will reach
the correct result,39 it does provide a framework to analyze systematically the interests involved.
III.

THE FREE SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY INTEREST IN RESIDENTIAL
PICKETING

O'Brien requires, first, a consideration of the speech interest in res-

idential picketing. Peaceful picketing--despite the fact that the picket
is engaged in conduct by walking back and forth on a public sidewalk
with a printed sign or placard-is "an exercise of [the] basic constitutional rights [of speech, assembly and petition] in their most pristine
and classic form."' Because of the conduct aspect of peaceful picketing, courts have had considerable difficulty in defining the precise extent to which it is protected by the first amendment.4 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court in Carey v. Brown recognized that "there can be no

doubt that in prohibiting picketing on the public streets and sidewalks
in residential neighborhoods, the Illinois statute regulates expressive
conduct that falls within the First Amendment's preserve."
Court also accepted as established that

2

The

38. 391 U.S. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
39. Indeed one can persuasively argue that the Supreme Court reached the wrong result in
O'Brien. T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 83-87.
40. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); accord Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940).
41. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
Professor Emerson has attempted to draw a distinction between labor and nonlabor picketing
based on the fact that the latter is aimed at the general public and is less likely to be economically
coercive. T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 455. See also DeGregory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910
(D. Conn. 1977). But see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982). However,
to the extent that the difference between labor and nonlabor picketing is content related, this
distinction cannot be used to determine who can properly engage in residential picketing. Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). But cf. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
It is well established that the first amendment does not protect picketing that is accompanied
by violence or the threat of violence. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963); Milk
Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941); cf. NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982). Nor does it protect picketing that seeks to
coerce an illegal objective. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607
(1980); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
But cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982). It also does not protect
pickets who trespass upon private property. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
42. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 460.
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"[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." . ..
"'[S]treets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so
historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights
that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot
constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely.' ,43
It is beyond dispute today that picketing is a form of protected conduct

and that public streets and sidewalks are public forums.
Assuming that residential picketing does not have an illegal objective or is not accompanied with violence or by trespasses on private

property,44 it cannot be abridged merely because some persons, or even
a majority, find it to be offensive. In a pluralistic society, the burden
normally falls on the viewer to avert his eyes from matters that offend
him.45 Thus in Cohen Y.California,4 the Supreme Court reversed the

conviction of a young man for "willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet
of any neighborhood or person. . . by. . .offensive conduct. ' 47 The
defendant had been observed in the Los Angeles County Courthouse

"wearing a jacket bearing the words 'Fuck the Draft.' ",48 Women and
children had been present when the defendant wore the jacket as a
means of informing the public of his feelings against the Vietnam War
and the draft.4 9 Speaking for the Court, Justice Harlan emphasized the
importance of allowing the defendant to express his emotions in his
chosen manner:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function:
it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact,
words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
43. Id. (quoting first Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) and second Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976)); see also United States v. Grace, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706-07 (1983); Kalven,
The Concept ofthe Public Forun Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1. The grounds of a
county jail, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), public buses, Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), and military bases, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), unlike
public streets and sidewalks, are public places that are not proper forums for first amendment
expression. However, once a state opens a forum to some it may not deny the use of that forum to
others based solely on the content of the speaker's message. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981). C Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S.Ct. 948 (1983).
44. See supra note 41.
45. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975); Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
46. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
47. Id. at 16 (quoting California penal statute) (ellipses by the Court).
48. Id. (quoting the California Court of Appeal at 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 97-98, 81 Cal. Rptr.
503, 505 (1969)).
49. Id.
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force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no
regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may
often be the more important element of the overall message sought to
be communicated. 50
Similarly, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 1 the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited the showing of films
containing nudity by a drive-in theatre when its screen was visible from
a public street or place. The Court rejected the City's argument that
the ordinance was necessary to protect its citizens, and especially minors, against unwilling exposure to materials that may be considered
offensive.
Nor may residential picketing be abridged simply because it intimidates someone. In Organizationfor a Better Austin v. Keefe,5 2 the
Supreme Court reversed an injunction issued by the Illinois courts enjoining a racially integrated community organization from distributing
in a Chicago suburb literature that was critical of a real estate broker's
alleged "blockbusting" and "panic peddling" activities. The Court, in
rejecting the broker's argument that the organization's activities invaded his right to privacy and were coercive and intimidating rather
than informative, noted:
The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive
impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the
First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent's conduct by their activities; that is not fundamentally different
from the function of a newspaper. .

.

. Petitioners were engaged

openly and vigorously in making the public aware of respondent's
real estate practices. Those practices were offensive to them, as the
views and practices of petitioners are no doubt offensive to others.
But so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not

meet standards of acceptability.5 3
Concerted action to protest racial discrimination by local
merchants was found to be protected by the first amendment in
NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware Co. 54 The Supreme Court reversed a
50. Id. at 26. See also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). Political hyperbole is
protected by the first amendment. "'[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and ... may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."' Id. at 708 (quoting from New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) ("[A] function of
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute." Id. at 4).
51. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
52. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
53. Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
54. 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
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$1,250,699 judgment against the NAACP for conducting a boycott, and
for picketing and marching against merchants in Port Gibson, Mississippi, on the ground that the practice of banding together to express
views is deeply embedded in our American political process." The
Court noted that the fact that some of the activities of the boycotters
may have caused apprehension in others did not by itself remove those
activities from the protection of the first amendment.- 6 The Court
found the emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers, one of the
leaders of the boycott, to be protected because "strong and effective
extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet
phrase."57 The Court also ruled that the NAACP could not be held
responsible for random acts of violence that occurred during the boycott, because the NAACP itself had never advocated nor condoned the
violence.
Nor may residential picketing be banned because the audience
may react violently against it. Although the Supreme Court has held
that so-called "fighting words," or speech that is likely to promote violence, may not be protected by the Constitution,58 the Court has narrowly restricted this exception so that fighting words must be directly
addressed to the person of the hearer 9 and directly incite "imminent
lawless action."'
That the audience may be hostile to the views expressed is insufficient to remove the speech from the protection of the
first amendment.6 In Gregory v. City of Chicago,6 2 the Supreme Court
reversed the convictions of persons who had marched in a peaceful and
orderly procession to the Mayor's residence to press their claims for the
desegregation of Chicago's public schools. The Chicago police had
told the protesters to disperse when the crowd of bystanders became
larger and more unruly and, when the marchers refused, had arrested
them for disorderly conduct. The Court found the record to be devoid
of any evidence that the marchers themselves had been disorderly.
The values served by extending first amendment protection to residential picketing are twofold. 63 First, an effective marketplace in a
democratic society depends upon free and open discussion that is
55. Id. at 3423.
56. Id. at 3424.
57. Id. at 3434.
58. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
59. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
60. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
102 S. Ct. 3409. (1982); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
61. But cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
62. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
63. See generaly G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1108-11
(10th ed. 1980); T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 6-9.
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aimed at finding truth.' As Justice Holmes recognized in his dissent in
Abrams v. United States, "the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."6 5 Additionally, if persons are inhibited from airing their grievances freely
and openly, they will often resort to clandestine measures or to violence
to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo.66 While peacefully
airing their grievance in the forum of their choosing, residential pickets
disseminate information and promote discussion of public issues in residential neighborhoods.
Second, the right to freedom of expression and assembly is a basic
human right. Thus as Justice Brandeis recognized, the forefathers
"who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties. . . . They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the
secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty."6 7
The liberty justification focuses more on the rights of the individual than does the marketplace justification. 68 The marketplace model
is primarily concerned with the contribution of ideas to the working of
a free society. However, the liberty model goes further and recognizes
that unless there is some intervening substantial governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of the message, the individual in a free
society ought to be able to determine how, when, where, and to whom
he wants to disseminate his idea or message. When the free speech
rights of one person appear to conflict with the privacy rights of another, both the marketplace model and the liberty model must be
considered.
IV.

THE INTEREST IN RESIDENTIAL PRIVACY

O'Brien requires, secondly, a consideration of whether there is a
substantial governmental interest, unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, in protecting residential privacy. The justification offered
64. T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 6-7; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409
(1982).
65. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66. See Seng, The Cairo Experience.- Civil Rights Litigation in a Racial Powderkeg, 61 OR.
L.J. 285 (1982); cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ("Whatever theoretical merit
there may be to the argument that there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governments is

without force where the existing structure of the government provides for peaceful and orderly
change." Id. at 501).
67. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also
Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983) ("Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual
freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty." Id. at 1858).
68. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, in CONSTITUTIONAL GovERNMENT IN AMERICA 45 (R. Collins ed. 1980).
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by the State of Illinois for the Residential Picketing Statute invalidated
by the Supreme Court in Carey v. Brown,69 as well as the justification
offered in virtually all cases involving residential picketing, was that
the Statute protected the right to privacy. However, the word "privacy" is virtually without meaning unless it is placed in a specific context. Warren and Brandeis in their classic work on the right of privacy
identified four different interests under the common name of privacy.7"
Of these four interests, the right to be free from intrusions upon one's
physical solitude or seclusion appears to be the interest protected by
residential picketing restrictions. 7 ' Simply put, residential picketing restrictions protect the right "to be let alone" in one's home.72
This right to be let alone as it is protected through residential picketing restrictions is not a federally protected constitutional right."3 The
69. 447 U.s. 455 (1980).
The preamble to the Illinois Residential Picketing Statute provided that
[tihe Legislature finds and declares that men in a free society have the right to enjoyment
of their homes; that the stability of community and family life cannot be maintained
unless the right to privacy and a sense of security and peace in the home are respected
and encouraged; that residential picketin&, however just the cause inspiring it, disrupts
home, family and communal life; that residential picketing is inappropriate in our society, where the jealously guarded iights of free speech and assembly have always been
associated with respect for the rights of others. For these reasons the Legislature finds
and declares this Article to be necessary.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 21.1-1 (1979). The Illinois Legislature did not amend the language of the
preamble to its current Residential Picketing Statute. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 21.1-1 (1981).
70. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). Dean Prosser has

categorized those interests as: 1) the right to be free from intrusions upon one's physical solitude
or seclusion, as by invasions of one's home or other quarters, or an illegal search of one's shopping
bag in a store; 2) the right to be free from publicity, of a highly objective kind, given to private
information about oneself, even though it is true and no action would lie for defamation; 3) the
right to be free from publicity that places oneself in a false light in the public eye; 4) the right not
to have one's name or likeness appropriated by another for his benefit. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804-14 (4th ed. 1971).
71. See T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 548.

72. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970); Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 70, at 195.
73. The Constitution protects the right of privacy from governmental instrusions in a number
of ways. The first amendment protects the freedom to associate and the right to privacy in one's
associations. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958). The third amendment prevents the peacetime quartering of soldiers in private residences; the fourth amendment affirms the right to be secure in one's person, home, papers and
effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination reflects a concern for privacy. Tehan v.
United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). Also, the ninth amendment's reservation of
rights may protect the right to privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court identified two general interests that are protected from governmental intrusions by the constitutional right of privacy-"[olne is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions." Id. at 599-600 (citations omitted).
In a dissenting opinion in Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), where the
majority upheld an opinion of the Public Utilities Commission for the District of Columbia al-
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intrusion caused by a residential picket is not the result of governmental action; rather it is the result of action by private individuals.74 As
Justice Stewart stated in Katz v. United States: "[T]he protection of a
person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property75 and of his very life, left
largely to the law of the individual States.

Even though it is not a federally protected constitutional right, the
interest one has to peace and quiet in his home is an important interest
that states can protect against encroachments by other persons. The
United States Supreme Court first recognized the power of state and
local governments to protect the peace and quiet of residential areas
against persons claiming the right of free speech in Kovacs v. Cooper.76
The Court upheld a city ordinance that forbade the use or operation on
the public streets of sound trucks or other amplification devices that
emitted "loud and raucous" noises.7 7 The ordinance was challenged by
a man who used an amplifier on his truck to broadcast comments about
a local labor dispute. The Court in upholding the ordinance coinlowing sound amplification devices to broadcast radio programs on city streetcars and buses, Justice Douglas noted:
The case comes down to the meaning of "liberty" as used in the Fifth Amendment.
Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom.
The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. Part of our claim to
privacy is in the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures. It gives the guarantee that a man's home is his castle beyond invasion
either by inquisitive or by officious people. A man loses that privacy of course when he
goes upon the streets or enters public places. But even in his activities outside the home
he has immunities from controls bearing on privacy. He may not be compelled against
his will to attend a religious service; he may not be forced to make an affirmation or
observe a ritual that violates his scruples; he may not be made to accept one religious,
political, or philosophical creed as against another. Freedom of religion and freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment give more than the privilege to worship, to
write, to speak as one chooses; they give freedom not to do nor to act as the government
chooses. The First Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the individual honors
the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes
are important aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone.
Id. at 467-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas's dissent was cited with approval by the
Supreme Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974), which upheld a ban
on political advertising in city buses.
74. Cf. Blum v. Yaretsky, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976).
75. 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (emphasis by the Court) (footnotes omitted).
76. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
77. Id. at 79. In Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), the Supreme Court had struck down
an ordinance that forbade the use of sound amplification devices except with permission of the
police on the ground that "[a]ny abuses which loud-speakers create can be controlled by narrowly
drawn statutes." Id. at 562. The Kovacs Court distinguished Sala on the ground that the Saia
ordinance prescribed no standards for the exercise of discretion by the police chief and because
the Kovacs ordinance barred only "loud and raucous" noises from the streets. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at
82-83.
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mented that sound trucks would be dangerous to traffic in heavily congested cities and that "in the residential thoroughfares the quiet and
tranquility so desirable for city dwellers would. . . be at the mercy of
advocates of particular religious, social or political persuasions."78
This substantial governmental interest justified prohibiting the use of
sound trucks in residential areas.
Two years later, in Breardv. Alexandria," the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that prohibited solicitors and peddlers from going
door to door to private residences if they had not been previously requested or invited to do so by the owners or occupants. The ordinance
was challenged as a violation of the first amendment by a man who was
arrested for going from door to door soliciting subscriptions for
magazines. The Court noted that the City had the power to protect its
citizens against "practices deemed subversive of privacy and of
quiet."8 0
78. 336 U.S. at 87.
In his concurring opinion in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. II (1969), Justice Black
commented:

Were the authority of government so trifling as to permit anyone with a complaint to
have the vast power to do anything he pleased, wherever he pleased, and whenever he
pleased, our customs and our habits of conduct, social, political, economic, ethical, and
religious, would all be wiped out, and become no more than relics of a gone but not
And perhaps worse than all other changes, homes, the sacred retreat
forgotten past ....
to which families repair for their privacy and their daily way of living, would have to
have their doors thrown open to all who desired to convert the occupants to new ideas,
new morals, and a new way of life. Men and women who hold public office would be
compelled, simply because they did hold public office, to lose the comforts and privacy
of an unpicketed home. I believe that our Constitution, written for the ages, to endure
except as changed in the manner it provides, did not create a government with such
monumental weaknesses. Speech and press are, of course, to be free, so that public matters can be discussed with impunity. But picketing and demonstrating can be regulated
like other conduct of men. I believe that the homes of men, sometimes the last citadel of
the tired, the weary, and the sick, can be protected by government from noisy, marching,
tramping, threatening picketers and demonstrators bent on filling the minds of men, women, and children with fears of the unknown.
Id. at 125 (Black, J., concurring).
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance restricting land use in a village to one-family dwellings and preventing not more than two
unrelated persons to live together in a single housekeeping unit in part on the legitimate objective
to keep residential areas free of "disturbing noises" and "increased traffic." Id. at 5.
79. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
80. Id. at 640. The Court quoted Professor Chafee:
Of all the methods of spreading unpopular ideas, [house-to-house canvassing] seems the
least entitled to extensive protection. The possibilities of persuasion are slight compared
with the certainties of annoyance. Great as is the value of exposing citizens to novel
views, home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut himself up in his own
ideas if he desires. There he should be free not only from unreasonable searches and
seizures but also from hearing uninvited strangers expound distasteful doctrines. A
doorbell cannot be disregarded like a handbill. It takes several minutes to ascertain the
purpose of a propagandist and at least several more to get rid of him . . . Moreover,
hospitable housewives dislike to leave a visitor on a windy doorstep while he explains his
errand, yet once he is inside the house robbery or worse may happen. So peddlers of
ideas and salesmen of salvation in odd brands seem to call for regulation as much as the
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The Supreme Court also relied upon the right to be let alone to
8

reach its decision in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department.

In that case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute
that allowed persons who had received uninvited advertisements for
sexually provocative materials to request the Postmaster General to issue an order "directing the sender and his agents or assigns to refrain
from further mailings to the named addressees. 82 Vendors of materials covered by the statute had contended that their rights of free speech
and due process had been violated. The Court noted that "[i]n today's
complex society we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient measure of individual autonomy must survive to
permit every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail. 8 3
Therefore, the Court categorically rejected the argument that a vendor
has a first amendment
right to send unwanted material into the home
84

of another.
However, in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, s5 the

Supreme Court refused to extend any privacy protection to a real estate
broker who claimed that persons were distributing leaflets to his neighbors. As noted earlier, the leaflets called the broker a "blockbuster"
and a "panic peddler" and urged recipients of the leaflets to telephone
the broker at his home and to urge him to sign an agreement to cease
these practices.8 6 The Court noted that
[n]o prior decisions support the claim that the interest of an individual in being free from public criticism of his business practices in
pamphlets or leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court.
Designating the conduct as an invasion of privacy, the apparent basis
for the injunction here, is not sufficient to support an injunction
against peaceful distribution of informational literature ...
[R]espondent is not attempting to stop the flow of information into
his own household, but to the public.8 7
Regulations restricting first amendment freedoms, even when residential privacy is the object of the protection, must be narrowly drafted
and must be no more restrictive than is necessary to achieve the govregular run of commercial canvassers. . .. Freedom of the home is as important as
freedom of speech.
341 U.S. at 639 n.27 (quoting Z. CRAFEE, FaE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406 (1941)) (ellipses by the Court).
81. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
82. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(b) (Supp. IV 1964) (currently at 39 U.S.C. § 3008(b) (1976)).
83. 397 U.S. at 736.
84. Id. at 738.
85. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
86. Id. at 416.
87. Id. at 419-20 (citations omitted).
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ernment's objective. Thus, in Martin v. City of Struthers,88 the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance that forbade any person to knock on
doors, ring doorbells, or otherwise summon to the door the occupants
of residences to distribute handbills or circulars. The Court noted that
door-to-door campaigning is a commonly accepted and effective technique to disseminate opinions and that the ordinance "substitute[d] the
judgment of the community for the judgment of the individual householder."8 9 The Court held that the decision whether to allow persons
to call at a home belonged to the homeowner and that the City could
punish only those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant.'
Similarly, in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizensfora Better Environment,9 the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited
door-to-door solicitation by charitable organizations that did not use at
least seventy-five percent of their receipts for charitable purposes, excluding administrative expenses. After recognizing that charitable solicitation in residential neighborhoods was within the protection of the
first amendment,92 the Court considered whether the restriction was
necessary to protect the citizens from fraud or from "undue annoyance."-93 The Court concluded that the Village could protect these interests "by measures less destructive of First Amendment interests. 9 4
V.

LESS RESTRICTIVE MEANS TO PROTECT RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY

Assuming then, as we must, that peaceful residential picketing is
protected by the first amendment and that states have a substantial interest, unrelated to the suppression of first amendment freedoms, in
protecting residential privacy, under the O'Brien test the next consideration must be whether an absolute ban on residential picketing is the
88. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
89. Id. at 144.
90. Id. at 148. The Court also noted that a city could institute identification procedures to
protect its citizens against criminals who pose as canvassers. But cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance forbidding door-to-door soliciting by commercial magazine vendors
upheld). In Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976), a city ordinance required an identification permit to canvass or solicit from door to door for charitable or political purposes. The
Court invalidated the ordinance as unacceptably vague. The Court recognized, however, that
prior cases indicated that door-to-door canvassing and soliciting was subject to reasonable regulations to protect citizens from crime and undue annoyance. Id. at 620.
91. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
92. Id. at 633.
93. Id. at 636.
94. Id. The Court noted that fraudulent misrepresentations could be prohibited and the penal laws used to punish such conduct directly. Id. at 637. It also noted that a provision permitting
homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting "No Solicitors" signs would be a less
intrusive and more effective measure to protect privacy. Id. at 639.
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least restrictive means of protecting the peace and quiet of persons in
their homes." The Supreme Court has consistently held that a state or
local government may protect individual privacy and regulate the right
96
to protest by enacting reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.
We therefore will consider, first, whether a ban on residential picketing
is merely a reasonable manner restriction because the demonstrators
have alternative means other than picketing to disseminate their ideas,
and second, whether a ban on residential picketing is merely a reasonable place restriction because alternative forums are available to the
demonstrators. Finally, we will consider whether residential peace and
quiet can be protected by means other than an absolute ban on residential picketing.
A. Alternative Methods of DisseminatingInformation

A possible justification for a ban on residential picketing is that the
prohibition does not unduly restrict first amendment rights because alternative channels for communication are still available. The ban
merely restricts the speaker from patrolling with a placard on the
streets and sidewalks in residential areas. It does not forbid disseminating information in the neighborhood by alternative methods such as
handing out leaflets, giving speeches from a soapbox, going door to
door, sending letters, using the news, broadcasting media, or the
telephone.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has never sustained a ban on
peaceful picketing solely because other channels of communication
were available.97 An argument that first amendment rights are not
abridged if the information can be made available in another way was
soundly rejected by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Boardof Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.:

We are aware of no general principle that freedom of speech may be
abridged when the speaker's listeners could come by his message by
some other means, such as seeking him out and asking him what it is.
Nor have we recognized any such limitation on the independent right
of the listener to receive the information sought to be communicated.
Certainly, the recipients of the political publications in Lamont 9"
could have gone abroad and thereafter disseminated them them95. See supra text accompanying note 38.
96. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
97. See supra notes 40-62 and accompanying text.
98. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of the United States, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (Court struck down
law that interfered with rights of citizens to receive political publications sent from abroad).
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selves. Those in Kleindienst99 who organized the lecture tour by a
foreign Marxist could have done the same. And the addressees of the
inmate correspondence in Procunier1° could have visited the prison
themselves. [Footnotes supplied.]' 0 '

Practically, it is doubtful if other methods of disseminating information are equally as effective as a picket. 0 2 A picket may attract attention and get coverage by local newspapers and media that leafletting
or door-to-door solicitations will not. That some persons will find resi-

dential picketing to be offensive and coercive may also be a reason why
utilize that form of communication to
demonstrators may decide to
"wake-up" a neighborhood. 0 3 Furthermore, other channels of communication may be more costly and thus not be available to those
whose causes are poorly financed. l " In Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 05 the Supreme Court, in striking down a

township ordinance forbidding the posting of "For Sale" signs in residential areas, noted:
Although in theory sellers remain free to employ a number of different alternatives, in practice realty is not marketed through leaflets,
sound trucks, demonstrations, or the like. The options to which sell99. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Court sustained Attorney General's denial of
visa to alien who wanted to come to the United States to participate in a conference).
100. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (Court sustained prison mail censorship
regulations).
101. 425 U.S. 748, 757 n.15 (1976). See also Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village of Schaumburg, 590 F.2d 220, 224 (7th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). But see Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951), where the Court noted that subscriptions to magazines could still be made by
anyone who was interested without the annoyance of house-to-house canvassing. Id. at 644. In
MetroMedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), without discussing the availability of
alternative channels of communication, the Court held that a city could properly ban billboards.
However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
Although there are alternative channels for communication of messages appearing on
billboards, such as newspapers, television, and radio, these alternatives. . . appear to be
less satisfactory. . . . Indeed the parties expressly stipulated that "[m]any businesses
and politicians and other persons rely upon outdoor advertising because other forms of
... Justice
advertising are insufficient, inappropriate and prohibitively expensive.
Black said it well when he stated the First Amendment's presumption that "all present
instruments of communication, as well as others that inventive genius may bring into
being, shall be free from governmental censorship or prohibition."
Id. at 525 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting first the joint Stipulation of Facts
in MetroMedia and second Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting)).
102. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Court noted that by proscribing picketing or loitering about a business the State had proscribed "nearly every practicable, effective
means whereby those interested-including the employees directly affected-may enlighten the
public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute." Id. at 104.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 52-68. Actually picketing may be less intrusive than
door-to-door canvassing. Cf. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
644 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

104. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
105. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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ers realistically are relegated-primarily newspaper advertising and
listing with real estate agents-involve more cost and less autonomy
than "For Sale" signs . . [They] are less likely to reach persons
not deliberately seeking sales information,. . . and may be less effective media for communicating the message that is conveyed by a
"For Sale" sign in front of the house °to
be sold . . . . The alterna6
tives, then, are far from satisfactory.
B. Alternative Forums
Another possible justification for a ban on residential picketing is
that the prohibition does not unduly restrict first amendment rights because alternative forums are available. Demonstrators are still free to
picket in the public parks and on the streets and sidewalks in nonresidential areas. For instance, the district court in sustaining the Illinois
Residential Picketing Statute noted that the Mayor of Chicago could
have been picketed at city hall rather than in front of his home. 107
The alternative forum argument was soundly rejected in Schneider
v. State, where the Supreme Court stated that "one is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on
the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." ' 8 In fact, some
106. Id. at 93 (citations omitted).
107. Brown v. Scott, 462 F. Supp. 518, 531 (N.D. Ill.
1978), rev'd, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979),
af'dsub nom Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
108. 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969), where the Court noted that "[flreedom of expression would not truly exist if
the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has [designated] as a
safe haven for crackpots." Id. at 513.
This argument assumes that the picketing will take place on the public streets and sidewalks,
which are traditional public forums and not on private property or on public property that is
traditionally closed to the public for first amendment purposes. See supra note 43. However, the
Supreme Court has on occasion considered the existence of alternative forums. In Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981), the Court sustained a
state rule that required religious and other groups to sell their literature from fixed booths at the
Minnesota State Fair. The Court explained that "[flor [the Rule] to be valid as a place and manner restriction, it must also be sufficiently clear that alternative forums for the expression of respondents' protected speech exist despite the effects of the Rule." Id. at 654. The Court noted that
the rule did not prevent the organization from engaging in its activities outside the fairgrounds.
Also, the rule did not deny the organization the right to conduct its activities at some point within
the fairground, and its members were free to mingle with the crowd and orally propagate their
views. The Court characterized the fairgrounds, unlike public streets and sidewalks, as a "limited
public forum in that it exists to provide a means for a great number of exhibitors temporarily to
present their products or views, be they commercial, religious, or political, to a large number of
people in an efficient fashion." Id. at 655.
In Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court sustained a city
zoning regulation that prevented the concentration of adult movie theaters in limited areas. The
Court noted that the restrictions did not affect the number of adult movie theaters that could
operate in the city or unduly deny the viewing public access to them. Id. at 62. But, in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), the Court struck down a zoning ordinance that
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persons, and arguably all persons, who may want to demonstrate in
residential areas will have no effective alternative forum. A maid who
is employed by a retired tycoon and who wants to protest her wages
and working conditions has no forum equal to the sidewalk in front of
her employer's residence."° Jews who want to publicize that a
semirecluse was formerly a commander in a Nazi concentration camp
may also find their most effective forum to be the street in front of his
house.
Even in the case of a mayor, it is far from clear that an adequate
alternative forum exists at city hall. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a picket at city hall would gain the attention of the mayor,
the argument ignores the right of pickets to address the audience of
their choice. If the demonstrators want to reach the neighbors of the
local official, and not just his political or business associates, then an
alternative forum outside the neighborhood will be inadequate. 0o The
protesters may also decide that the residential forum is a better alternative because the picket will receive better news coverage than one conducted in front of city hall or on a commercial thoroughfare.'
C. Less Restrictive Alternatives
There are numerous ways that state and local governments can
regulate picketing short of an absolute ban so as to preserve the peace
and quiet of residential neighborhoods. The pickets can be prevented
from being loud and boisterous and from using sound trucks and blowing horns." 2 They can be prevented from trespassing onto private
prohibited live entertainment, including nude dancing, from the Borough. The Court emphasized
that "[t]o be reasonable, time, place, and manner restrictions not only must serve significant state
interests but also must leave open adequate alternative channels of communication." Id. at 75-76.
Similarly, in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), the Court sustained an ordinance that prohibited sound trucks from the public streets, noting that the trucks "may be utilized in places such as
parks or other open spaces off the streets." Id. at 85. However, in United States v. Grace, 103 S.
Ct. 1702 (1983), the Court struck down 40 U.S.C. 13k (1976), which prohibited displaying any
banner on the sidewalks in front of the Supreme Court Building. The Court rejected the Government's argument that this was a reasonable "place" restriction having only a minimal impact on
expressive activity because the prohibition had insufficient nexus with any of the public interests
that may be thought to undergird § 13k. Grace, 103 S. Ct. at 1708-10.
109. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 479-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Hibbs v. Neighborhood Org. to Rejuvenate Tenant Hous., 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622 (1969).
110. Cf. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145 (1943).
The neighbors also have a constitutional right to receive the message and the demonstrators
have standing to raise the first amendment rights of their audience. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1979).
i11. Cf. Brown v. Scott, 462 F. Supp. 518, 531 (N.D. I11. 1978), rev'd, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir.
1979), ajf'dsub non. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).

112. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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property." 3 The number of pickets can be limited," l4 and the spaces
between them regulated so that the streets and sidewalks are not obstructed. " 5 Also, the time during which the'picket is conducted is subject to reasonable regulation." l6 A narrowly drafted statute or
ordinance containing reasonable restrictions to protect the peace and
quiet of residential areas is thus possible." 7
Such restrictions may not totally eliminate the discomfort that
some persons will feel in knowing that even one solitary picket is patrolling the sidewalk in front of his home." 8 Nonetheless, the first
amendment right of the peaceful picket to disseminate his message effectively to the desired neighborhood audience cannot be thwarted.
Ultimately, "[t]he plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, 'we are inescapably captive audiences for many
purposes.' "'119
VI.

CONCLUSION

To be sure, a state can constitutionally impose reasonable time,
place and manner regulations on the use of residential streets and sidewalks for picketing.120 It can regulate the number of pickets, and the
hours during which they may picket; it can prohibit loud and raucous
picketing and the use of offensive sound amplifying devices; it can prohibit pickets from interfering with traffic on the public streets and sidewalks and from trespassing on private property. But legislation
2
regulating the right to use public streets must be narrowly drawn,' '
and the right to use the streets for communication of views "must not,
113. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
114. See United States v. Pyle, 518 F. Supp. 139, 160 (E.D. Pa. 1981). But see Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1968) (ordinance that limited the number of pickets to two,
regardless of the time, place or circumstances, held unconstitutional).
115. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Coxv. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
573 (1941).
116. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Carpenters & Joiners Union,
Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 738 (1942) (Reed, J., dissenting).
117. See T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 559; Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 124
(1969) (Black, J., concurring).
118. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Presumably, the
state has power to proscribe deliberate, scurrilous verbal or visual assaults upon the householder.
See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 n.6 (1975) (quoting Rosenfeld v. New
Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905-06 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
119. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (quoting Rowan v. United
States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)).
120. See United States v. Grace, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706-07 (1983); Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
121. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied."' 2 2 As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly stressed:
"[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in
of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
the light 123
purpose."'

If such is the law, it is doubtful that a total ban on residential picketing
is constitutional. As Justice Black stated in his concurring opinion in
Gregory v. City of Chicago, "[niarrowly drawn statutes regulating the
conduct of demonstrators and picketers are not impossible to draft."' 24

122. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
123. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 238-39 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting

in part) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
124. 394 U.S. 111, 124 (1969).
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